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NATO:
THE U.S. COMMITMENT+
Spencer Tall*
Introduction
In the closing phase of the Second World
War, seven weeks after the capitulation of Nazi
Germany and six weeks before the Hiroshima
bomb, representatives of fifty nations signed the
United Nations Charter in San Francisco.
The
date was June 26, 1945, and the world hoped that
it had at last learned how to keep the peace.
Within
four years,
however,
ten
European
countries found themselves faced by a threat, the
nature of which necessitated some more specific
protection than that afforded by the United
Nations
Charter.
Exercising the
right
of
individual or collective self-defense (under Article
51 of the United Nations Charter), the Europeans
turned to the United States and Canada to
underwrite their pledge of mutual security and,
on Ap11_1 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was
signed.
U.S. relations with its major allies, the
NATO countries, have in recent years been
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particularly troubled by differences over what
constitutes an appropriate sharing of the burdens
and benefits of alliance.
The United States
initially discouraged its European allies from
heavy spending on defense so that they might
concentrate on economic recovery instead. In the
last twenty-five years, however, the economic
growth of the United States has not kept pace
with that of its major allies. At the same time
global and military responsibilities of the- United
States have grown while the Europeans have
pulled back from global military involvement.
Many Americans believe that although our defense
efforts are vitally important to our own security,
they also contribute a major share of the physical
security enjoyed by our NATO allies.
Such
discrepancies in defense burden sharing- were
accepted when the Europeans were involved in
massive post-war reconstruction efforts and were
economically unsteady.
But now there is a
question as to whether the allies have become too
dependent on the United States militarily, while
reaping the advantages of the strong economies
that have benefited from the United States'
security efforts.
It seems that a lot of the burden sharing
problem is inherent in the structure of the alliance systems that the United States developed
following the Second World War. During this time
the focus of U.S. policy was not a build-up of
European national forces.
Then Secretary of
State Dean Acheson, testifying before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee in 1949, described
the U.S. attitude in the following terms:

. economic recovery is a prior
necessity ; therefore the size of the
European forces must be such that they
do not interfere with recovery. And it
looks as though they will :fontinue to be
quite small for some time.
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This kind of attitude has characterized the U.S.
commitment to Allied defense ever since.
Original Formation
After the German surrender, the Western
Powers, true to the wartime pledges and to
popular demand, began to demobilize. The armed
strength of the Allied forces in Europe at the
time of the surrender of Germany was about five
million men.
One year later, following demobilization, their armed strength amounted to no
The Soviet Union, on
more than 880, 000 men.
the other hand, continued to keep its armed
forces at a wartime level. In 1945, its strength
amounted to more than four million men. It also
showed no slowing in its war industries.
The
economic assistance that was offered by the
United States during these first post-war years
was also open to the Soviet Union and the countries behind the Iron Curtain. Stalin refused all
American aid for the USSR and, despite initial
interest on the part of both Czechoslovakia and
Poland, forced satellite governments to do likewise.
From the outset there were problems with
peace treaties. At a meeting in San Francisco, in
1945, the USSR and the Western powers were
unable to agree on the composition of a Polish
provisional government. At the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in September of 1945,
Mr. Molotov blocked any discussion of the United
King-dom's proposal for the opening of an impartial
inquiry jnto the situation in Rumania and
Bulgaria.
The Peace Conference opened in Paris on
July 29, 1946, and peace treaties with Italy,
Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Ru mania were
among the accomplishments, but they were not
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signed until Febru::iry 10, 1947. In March of that
year the Foreign Ministers met in Moscow to
discuss the drafting of peace treaties with
Germany and Austria. They were unable to agree
on what Germany's fate should be. In November
of the same year a new Foreign Ministers' Conference was held in London, but it did no more than
confirm the impossibility of agreement.
Shortly
afterward, the Soviet representatives ceased to
take part in the Allied Control Council in Berlin.
For all practical purposes, the stalemate at the
1947 Moscow Conference put an end to the
cooperation which had developed between the
USSR and the Western democratic countries during the war.
Soviet territorial expansion under Stalin had
already begun during the war by the annexation
of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithmmia, together with
certain parts of Finland,
Poland,
Ru mania,
North-Eastern
Germany,
and
Eastern
Czechoslovakia.
This territorial expansion continued after the defeat of Germany and was supplemented by a policy of control over the countries of Albania, Bulgaria, Ru mania, Easte14n
Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.
Because of these events, the world found
itself split into two blocs. In 1948, Mr. Ernest
Bevin, the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary,
suggested a
formula for a Western union
consisting of a network of bilateral agreements
along the lines of the Dunkirk Treaty. 5 This was
a treaty signed by France and the United
Kingdom promising mutual assistance for fifty
years in the event of any renewed attempt at
aggression by Germany. Although the idea was
warmly welcomed, it was felt that the Rio Treaty
would be much better as a model because it was
an agreement between the U.S. and Latin America
to defend each other against any aggression and
provided an example of regional grouping.
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On March 17, 1948, the Brussels Treaty was
signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
These
countries pledged themselves to build up a common defense system and to strengthen their
economic and cultural ties.
Scarcely was this
treaty signed when the Soviets started the blockade of West Berlin. It lasted for 323 days and
was only countered by the org-anization of an airlift by the Western powers. The Berlin blockade
had the definite effect of hastening the setup of a
total Western defense.
On April 28, 1948, the idea of a single
mutual defense system, including and superseding
the Brussels Treaty, was publicly put forward by
Mr. St. Laurent in the Canadian House of Commons.
It was recognized by all the parties
involved that it was essential that the United
States should be able, constitutionally, to join the
Atlantic
Alliance.
To
that
end,
Senator
Vandenberg drew up a resolution which recommended th~ United States' involvement in the
agreement.
This resolution was adopted on
June 11, 1948, by the U.S. Senate. The text of
the treaty was published on March 18, 1949, and
on April 4, 1949, in spite of the pressure
brought to bear by the Soviet Union on the
parties to the treaty, twelve fations joined
together and signed the document.
Subsequently, three other countries joined the twelve original signatories. Greece and Turkey were invited
to join the alliance in September, 1951, and the
Federal - Republic of Germany was invited to
accede to the treaty following the ~ignature of the
Paris Agreements in October 1954.
North Atlantic Treaty Analysis
The North Atlantic Treaty is the framework
for wide cooperation among its signatories. The
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organization is not just a military alliance but one
which also provides for continuing joint action in
the political, economic, and social fields.
It
consists of a preamble and fourteen articles.
The preamble outlines the treaty's main
features.
It emphasizes the fact that it is a
treaty for the defense of a way of life , not only
by military means, but also through all other
aspects of alliance.
The articles define the responsibilities of
each of the signatories.
They also clarify the
fact that the obligations undertaken by the
signatories are both external (the bringing about
of a better understanding of the principles upon
which Western
Civilization is founded)
and
internal
(the
strengthening
of
their
free
institutions and the elimination of disputes or
conflicts within the alliance in the economic and
social fields) . They also contain a very important
provision, namely that the parties involved agree
that an armed attack against one or more of them
in Europe or North America shall be considered
an attack against them all.
At the same time,
however, each country is free to take whatever
action it judges necessary.
This way every
armed attack does not of necessity call for an
automatic declaration of general war.
Also provided within the articles is the
possibility of revisions to the treaty or withdrawals from it. After the treaty has been in force
for ten years, the parties may agree to revise it.
After twenty years any party may put an end to
its own participation, giving one year's notice of
denunciation. As for the treaty itself, it is of
unlimited duration and will remain in force for as
long as it is considered useful, irrespective of
any decision by any individual member to
withdraw.
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Changing Perspectives of the Administrations
In the early 1950s, mechanisms were established to provide for scrutiny of the defense
efforts of NATO members. Cost sharing formulas
were also arranged to provide for financing of
NA TO "infrastructure" costs such as the expense
of facilities, services, and programs regarded to
be of common benefit to the alliance members.
The cost sharing program has operated essentially
on the "ability to pay" principle.
In earlier
times, the United StAtes agreed to pay the larg-est
share of infrastructure expenses. In subsequent
years the U.S. share has been progressively
reduced until it now constitute9 approximately 27
percent of infrastructure costs.
Since the 1950s, as Europe has become more
financially stable, the United States has continually sought a greater amount of participation
from its allies.
This participation involves not
only a military commitment, but an economic one
as well.
The Kennedy /Johnson Administrations
The Administration of President John F.
Kennedy in the early 1960s advocated a policy of
Atlantic partnership with shared responsibilities
between the United States and an eventually
united Europe. This period witnessed the beginning of the financial arrangements between the
United -States and West Germany designed to
offset the costs of stationing U.S. forces in that
country.
In 1961, the United States and West
Germany agreed to an offset program whereby
West Germany would purchase military equipment
in the United States so as to compensate for U.S.
military expenditures in West Germany.
These
agreements were renewed and expanded in later
administrations to include purchases of U.S.
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treasury bonds and, in the 1970s, repair icPf
barracks used by American forces in Germany.
During- the Johnson Administration,
the
problems with the Vietnam experience, French
withdrawal from the integrated military structure
of NATO in 1966, and U. S . economic problems
coupled with general diminished support in Congress for U.S. overseas troop commi!ments,
contributed to the administration's pressures on
the Europeans to increase their defense efforts.
All of this prompted the first of the
"Mansfield Resolutions" on August 31,
1966.
Though these resolutions and similar efforts
through 197 4 failed to win fin al passag-e, they did
force Congress and the administration to take a
hard look at the various commitments to the
treaty by the parties involved.
The resolution
judged that "the condition of our European allies,
both economically and militarily , has appreciably
improved since large contingents of forces were
deployed"; the commitment by all members of t he
North Atlantic Treaty is based upon the full
cooperation of all treaty partners in contributing
materials and men on fair and equitable terms,
but
"such
contributions
have
not
been
forthcoming from all other members"; "relations
between the two parts of Europe are now
characterized by an increasing two-way flow of
trade, people, and their peaceful exchange"; and
"the
present
policy
of
maintaining
large
contingents of United States forces and their
dependents on the European Conti nent also
contribu t es further to the fiscal and monetary
problems of the United States." The Senate was
asked to resolve that "a substantial reduction of
United States Forces permanently stationed in
Europe can be made without adversely affecting
either our resolve or ability to meet rur
commitment under the North Atlantic Treaty." 1
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The Nixon /Ford Administrations
The Nixon Administration was also concerned
about C. S. balance of payments problems. But
U.S. efforts to get the .Europeans to compensate
for the U.S. presence in terms of new offset
deals, trade, or monetary concessions made little
headway with the Europeans. The allies objected
to the prospect of American troops becoming a
type of mercenary presence in Europe and argued
that the U.S. troop presence was, after all, in
America's as well as Europe's interest.
The development of the "Nixon Doctrine, 1112
first enunciated in an Asian context in Guam in
1969 and subsequently applied globally, brought a
turn away from intensive efforts to get the
Europeans to redress financial imbalances caused
by the troop presence.
U.S. policy began to
focus almost exclusively on encouraging the allies
to make improvements in their own defense capabilities. This was a sharp refocusing of U.S.
policy and set the tone for the subsequent decade. President Nixon felt that NATO's conventional forces should not only be maintained, but
in certain key areas, stren gihened. He felt that
the United States should maintain and improve its
own forces in Europe if the allies would take a
similar approach, and should not reduce them
unless there was reciprocal action from our
adversaries.
The main success of the new U.S. policy was
the encourag-ement it gave to the European allies
to intensify the work of the Eurogroup.
The
Eurogroup started as an informal caucus of
European defense ministers, meeting originally in
1968, and progressed into a very powerful body.
The first major Eurogroup project was the
European Defense IT:Provement Program announced
in December 1970.
The program represented
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about one billion dollars (1970 prices) of European
defense improvements over a five-year period. It
included increased European contributions to
NA TO infrastructure costs and special nation
force improvements.
These increased European
contributions,
along with a combination of other events in the
mid-1970s, decreased congressional press~re for
unilateral U. S. troop reductions in Europe.
A
major influence was the talks on mutual force
reductions which opened between NATO and
Warsaw Pact delegations in Vienna in 1973. The
Nixon Administration a nd the successor administration under President Gerald Ford argued that
chances of getting the Warsaw Pact countries to
reduce their forces would be undermined if the
United States reduced unilaterally. In addition,
reports of Warsaw Pact force improvements tended
to weaken the case for Western troop reductions.
On the financial front , U.S. balance of p ayments
improved considerab1f in 1975, lessening pressure
4
from that quarter.
Also, during this time
Congress became very aware of the U.S. commitment abroad, and worked on the streamlining of
U.S . forces and placed increased emphasis on
interoperability and standardization of NATO
equipment.
The Carter Administration
The policies under President Jimmy Carter
basically continued the policy approaches of the
Nixon and Ford Administr ::itions. Efforts focused
on encouraging improvements in European forces,
promoting efficiencies in alliance defense cooperation, and continuing to improve U.S. forces
committed to NATO.
In May 1977, the Carter Administration
proposed a new long-term defense program for
the alliance. An important part of this program
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was that NATO countries pledge to increase
defense expenditures in real terms 3 percent
above inflation during the life of the program.
In May 1978, a summit-level NATO meeting was
held in Washington and the program of defense
improvements that had been developed over the
preceding
year,
includ~
the
3
percent
commitment, was approved.
In 1979 and 1980, a number of factors created renewed concern about European defense
efforts.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
reinforced the consensus in the United States in
support of major increases in U.S. defense
expenditures in Europe. But most Europeans did
not interpret the invasion as a direct threat to
Europe and were therefore reluctant to see it as
requiring additional defense efforts on the part of
the allies. Furthermore, economic growth slowed
in most European countries in 1980 and 1981,
making real increases in defense spending P11_15ticularly difficult, if not impossible, to achieve .
In
1979
and
1980,
Congress
showed
increasing impatience with the defense efforts of
the allies by requiring the Secretary of Defense
to report on allied progress toward meeting the
3 percent spending objective, to describe cost
sharing arrangements within NATO, and to explain efforts being undertaken to equalize the
sharing of defense burdens with NATO allies.
The Reagan Administration
The Reagan Administration transmitted the
required report to the Congress in March 1981.
The report found that, on the average, the allies
had failed to meet the 3 percent objectives in all
three years of its existence.
The report also
stated that while failure of the allies to meet the
commitment could be seen by the Soviet Union as
a weakening of the collective resolve and could
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result in widespread shortfalls in meeting NATO
force goals, fixed percentage contributions from
allied governments are an issue of somewhat
lesser importance than development of a mutually
agreed, coherent effort to counter the Soviet
challenge. The report concluded that, based on
quantitative indicators developed for the report ,
the allies as a group appeared to be shouldering
at least their fair share of the NA TO defense
burden, with some allies carrying so~what more
than their fair share and others less.
The Reagan Administration has been very
diligent about working with U.S. allies and negotiating in good faith toward funding participation
at an equal level by all parties concerned. To
achieve this it seems that the opinions of both
sides need to be considered, and a more accurate
method of measuring the commitments of each
participating country needs to be implemented .
Measuring Defense Efforts:

Opposing Concepts

It seems that there is no one definitive way
to measure contributions to Western security.
The very selection of measuring devices depends
heavily on subjective considerations that can vary
according to di ffering national historical expe riences, threat perceptions (particularly prominent
in relationships with Europe), world roles, ideological assumptions, and concepts of security.
Furthermore , there are a number of more technical questions associated with attempts to compare
defense efforts . For example , some items, such
as the expense of military retirement programs,
are included in some defense budges while they
are excluded from others. Even more confusion
is caused when one finds that it is at least
possible to assess inputs (defense spending) by
using graphs and tables but virtually impossible
to quantify the outputs (capabilities of the forces
resulting from defense programs).
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American Perspectives
It seems that the dominant official and
unofficial American perspective on burden sharing
is that the allies should do more.
Over the
years, American observers have used a great
variety of arguments to buttress the case for
increased allied defense efforts.
The following
arfrUments have been among the most prominent:
--By all quantitative measures of expenditures, the United States spends more on defense
than its allies. In 1982, the United States spent
more on its defense bud¥§!t than the European
allies and Japan combined.
--U.S. strategic forces, which would be
essential for U.S. national security even if the
United States were not committed to participate in
European and Japanese defense, nonetheless are
the ultimate guarantee of Western security and
are essential to allied security.
--U.S. global military commitments contribute
to Western security. The global U.S. naval role,
in particular, makes a direct contribution to the
security of Western Europe to the extent that it
protects Western maritime trade and access to
vital raw materials, oil in particular.
Military
efforts in the Persian Gulf region are of increasing importance and expense to the United States.
--A major U.S. role in the defense of Europe
and Japan was warranted when our allies were
weak economically with fragile political structures,
but the economic and political maturity of the
allies now sugg-ests that they should play an
increasingly more responsible role in their own
defense.
Under the protective shield of the
United States, our allies have been able to modernize their industrial plant. The U.S. industrial
plant is on average considerably older than that
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of our allies, contributing to a competitive advantage for our allies in international trade.
--The increased threat of Soviet aggression
warrants large increases in defense spending. If
the United States is g-oing to make sacrifices to
take the le;:id in this effort, the allies should be
willing to put forth at least the same effort.
Allied Perspectives
While some allies agree that their countries
should increase their relative share of the Western defense burden, the prevalent feeling- is that
many American criticisms of their defense efforts
are unwarranted.
They feel that the United States is overreacting to the Soviet threat. They feel that the
Soviets
have
in
fact
been
weakened
by
Afghanistan and the events in Poland and will not
be tempted to attack any of the NATO allies if
already planned improvements in Western defense
are made.
Facts and Figures Put Forth by the Allies
Expenditure .
In 1981, Eurogroup contributes contributed about $80 billion to NATO's total
defense expenditure. During 1970-78 , their real
spending rose an average of about 2 percent per
year over and above inflation, so that by the end
of the 1970s, NATO allies had taken on a proportionately greater share of the commoi_r defense
burden than it carried ten years earlier. 9
Force Levels and Manpower . Of the ready
forces currently available in Europe, ;:ibout 91
percent of the ground forces and 86 percent of
the air forces come from European countries, as
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do 75 percent of NATO's tanks and more than 90
percent of its armored divisions. The size of the
armed forces of European countries amounts in
peacetime to some 3 million, rising to nearly 6
million when reserves with an assigned role in
mobilization are included.
The North A~ rican
figures are 2 .15 million, rising to 3 million. 0
Other Contributions by the Allies.
Some
allied contributions to Western defense cannot be
measured in terms of defense expenditures alone.
West Germany, for example, contributes a great
deal of real estate to the support of NATO
forces. The costs of foregoing other productive
uses of that real estate and of lost tax revenues
are substantial.
Continuing Arguments by the Allies.
The
allies argue that Americans cannot understand
Scandinavian approaches to defense without taking
into account the tradition of small standing forces
combined with far more extensive civilian participation in contingency war plans through the
integration of reserve and militia forces in territorial defense plans than is the case in the United
States.
Also, because most continental allies
maintain some form of conscription, manpower
costs are lower than the costs incurred by the
United States for volunteer service.
Both Britain and France continue to maintain
strategic nuclear forces which enhance the deterrence effect of U.S . capabilities. Over the last
thirty years, the allies have purchased far more
military equipment from the United States than
the United States has purchased from allied arms
manufacturers. U.S. industrial profits, employment, and balance of payments have all benefited
from this fairly one-sided trade.
These various arguments coming from both
sides have shaped the relationship within NATO
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for years now, but in recent times another very
important burden sharing issue has come to have
a great effect on that relationship.
Third World Security as a
Burden Sharing Issue
How to interpret and deal with p9tential
threats to Western security arising outside of
NATO's boundaries has been one of the most
difficult burden sharing issues for the alliance in
recent years.
With the Iranian crisis and the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. felt that
the West had need to strengthen its military
posture in the Persian Gulf region. The threat
in this region was seen by the U.S. as a continuum of Soviet threats with which Europe had just
as much reason to be concerned as the United
States. Out of this perception grew demands for
European contributions to security in the region
through increased European defense efforts in
Europe to provide greater flexibility for the U.S.
to shift resources to Persian Gulf contingencies.
The Europeans, taking a different point of
view, were of the opinion that the instability in
the Persian Gulf area was most likely the result
of factors indigenous to Middle Eastern countries
and conflicts among regional countries (e.g., the
Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iran-Iraq war), and not
Soviet subversion or indirect involvement in the
region (e.g., aid t2 PLO, Syria, and indigenous
1
Communist parties) .
The different perspectives taken by the
United States and its allies come from differing
national roles, capabilities, and historical experiences. The United States is a global power with
global military capabilities while the European
nations are, with the exception of France and to
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a lesser extent Great Britain, regional ~owers
with military capabilities limited to Europe. 2
The decline over the last thirty years in
Europe's ability to influence events in the Third
World w::is accompanied by an evolving strategic
approach to Third World problems.
European
policies became increasingly dependent on political
and economic instruments to influence events in
the Third World.
The American experience in
Vietnam confirmed for many Europeans the wisdom
of using military force as a last resort in the
Third World.
West European leaders, for the most part,
t::ike the position that the West derives considerable security from the needs of Third World
countries for access to Western markets and
technology. They also believe that similar Soviet
requirements for Western technology and other
Western goods, such as wheat, tend to constrain
Soviet temptations to intervene in Third World
trouble spots. They are inclined to believe that
instead of a military intervention, in many cases
Western interests can be more effectively advanced by developing economic ties with Third
World nations. On the whole, the Europeans can
be expected to use military power only when
political and economic approaches have failed and
vital interests are threatened. Both France and
Great Britain, however, and a few other European
countries, retain some capability for militflry
involvement in the Third World, particularly in
Africa and the Middle East, and their use of that
capability is not totally excluded. Both France
and Italy have demonstrated by their participation
in the multinational force in Lebanon that
European military contributions to Western interests in the Third World are not out of the question. It seems, though, that the European allies
will continue to resist any formal linkage between
the
NA TO
commitments
and
Third
World
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contingencies, meaning that the Europeans will
continue to oppose any formal extension of
NATO's boundaries.
Technical Problems with Measuring
The problems with measuring the various
commitments to burden sharing within NATO are
not only limited to political, social, or ec_onomic
factors, there are in addition a number of technical difficulties that make measuring these appropriate shares of the Western defense burden
difficult.
These problems include fluctuating
currency exchange
rates,
differing
national
approaches to defense budgeting, and the fact
that no quantitative methods effectively measure
the quality or will of military forces. Therefore,
determining what constitutes an equitable sharing
of alliance burdens is , ultimately , a very subjective political process.
Policy Options for the U. S.
If the policymakers within the United States
decide that, in principle, the allies should make a
greater contribution, there are a number of
different approaches that need to be taken into
consideration . At the level of high policy, the
choice of approaches depends on the value attached to alliance relationships by the participants.
For example, the U.S. contributions to
NATO defenses and security are perceived by the
governments of all NATO allies as a vital element
of their national security. They therefore want
the contribution to continue, which creates a
certain amount of leverage that the United States
can use to influence the allies' policies and defense spending.

The values that American observers place on
our alliance relationships can also influence policy
approaches to a certain degree. Those who see
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little selfrinterest in U.S. defense commitments to
Europe would likely be willing to risk far more
acrimony in relation ships with the allies. If one
believes that there is no compelling political or
military rationale, in terms of U.S. interest, for
the presence of sizable contingents of U.S. forces
in Europe, then the threat of withdrawal of these
forces may be a credible source of leverage. On
the other hand, those who see basic commitments
to the defense of Europe as clearly beneficial to
U.S. interests would presumably _want to work
within the context of those commitments to encourage lare:er allied contributions to Western
security.
Once it is accepted that the U.S.
commitment is derived from self-interest rather
than from any sense of charity, there are some
constraints on the levers available to pressure the
allies. The risks of rupturing the alliance relationship are greatly reduced under this assumption, and, for better or worse, the possibilities
for fundamental changes in the relationship are
diminished. Since World War II this approach has
g-enerally characterized U.S. policy toward the
defense efforts of its allies.
Legislative Approaches
The U.S. Congress cannot require the allies
to increase defense efforts. The Congress can,
however, require the administration to take
actions to increase pressure on the allies or can
provide the administration with levers to "use"
the allies. The most direct approach is through
the defense authorization process. Amendment of
::mthorization bills has been used in the past to
deny funds for activities that the Cong-ress
decided should more appropriately be funded by
an ally. For example, the FY82 authorization bill
on military construction "killed" a 6. 4 million
dollar authorization to harden logistical facilities
for tactical aircraft in Europe, on the g-rouncL,3hat
NA TO as a whole should pay these expenses."
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Even if the threat of massive troop withdrawals is foregone as too extreme, some members
of Congress might want to use the threat of
marginal reductions as a means of pressuring the
allies to improve their own defense efforts, to
contribute more to the costs of the U.S. presence, or both.
Summary
While it is understood that a subject as
broad as this one can take up many volumes, the
purpose of this paper has been to explain what
the current policy toward burden sharing within
NATO is, and to help clarify where those policies
may take us in the future.
From this perspective, it seems that the
burden sharing problem is inherent in the structure of the alliance systems that the United States
developed following World War II.
U. S defense
commitments arise from the perception that Soviet
dominance in Western Europe would pose a
long-term threat to U. S. economic well-being and
national security.
That perception, plus allied
weakness in the 1940s and early 1950s, underlies
the structure of our alliance systems and has
determined U.S . force structures which give rise
to relatively high costs for the United States . If
the United States wants to encourage increased
defense efforts while simultaneously sustaining a
broad base of support for the alliance in Europe,
then policies must be designed with greRt sensitivity to the political and economic circumstances
in the allied countries. Forms of pressure that
produce friction but no increases in defense
efforts would, from this perspective , be counterproductive for U. S . interests.
Self-interest naturally dictates that U.S.
officials should try to get the allies to do whatever will relieve the defense burden confronting the
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American people. Similarly, European officials see
it as their responsibility to pursue defense
spending policies consistent with their political
mandates and responsibilities.
The view from this perspective is that the
allies should do somewhat more than they are now
doing, but that the United States should approach
this subject with a policy that seeks to understand the European commitment by both input and
output. The U.S. should not just consider the
dollar amounts that are committed, but the
economic capabilities in relation to that commitment
as well.
In summary, barring any unexpected and
dramatic security threats, the current expectation
is for trends in allied spending patterns to continue as they have in the recent past. There will
probably be no substantial shifts in the apportionment of Western defense burdens without
overall reductions in allied defense capabilities
unless they should come as a product of arms
control agreements with the Soviet Union.
As
long as the underlying perceptions and alliance
structures remain valid and the United States
wishes to remain a global power, the United
States will likely continue to spend more on
defense than its allies.
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The Eurog-roup
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Table 1:

U.S. Forces Stationed in Europe*
(as of September 30, 1982)
ARMY

Belgium
1,469
Germany (incl. Berlin)
218,215
663
Greece
Greenland
2
Iceland
Italy
4,538
Netherhmds
779
Norway
35
62
Portugnl
22
Spain
Turkey
1,229
United King-dom
184
Afloat
227j270
TOTAL IN EUROPE
(227,245)
(TOTAL COMMITTED
TO NATO)
NATO FORCES ::is % of TOTAL 28%

NAVY

MARINE
CORPS
32
90
15

AIR
FORCE

1 , 708
3,999
15
31
347
3,650
77
2,291
26,621
39,564
(12,938)

13
13
194
19
334
5,932
7,224
(1,216)

81,575
(81,588)

2,261
256,391
3,540
325
2,871
13,055
2,578
194
1,505
8,950
5,162
25,893
32,553
355,633
(322,957)

2%

0.05%

13%

14.5%

115

288
390

109
261
9

645
37,798
2,472
325
1,052
4,257
1,775

TOTAL
DoD

115

1,083
5,084
3,837
23,084

*The continuing resolution for FY83 defense appropriations froze levels of
U.S. troops "on shore" in Europe at 315, 600.

Table 2:

--

NATO Defense Efforts

Defense Spending 1981(comparisons corrected for inflation)
Total
armed forces
109,000
81,000
31,000
578,000
495,000
186,000
517,000
1,000
106,000
40,000
91,000
347,000
769,000
335,000
2,189,000

% change from
previous year
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States

4-year avg
% change

0.2
3.0
0 .1 •
3.5
3.4
5.6
-1.2
7.1
3.4
2.5
2.8

2.77
1. 75
1.35
3.97
2.55
-0.3
1.93
8.7
0.25
3.48
4.55

3.1
2.1
5.4

1.95
1.8
3.78

---

----

as a % of
GDP
3. 3
1.8
2.5
4.2
3.4
5. 9
2.5
1.3
3.2
2.9
3.6
1.9
4.8
5. 0 .
5.8

as a % of
gov't
spending
9.2
8.3
7.3
20.7
28.2
20.3
5.6
3.5
9.7
9.0
10.9
11. 7
20.7
12.1
25.3
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